There have been many studies on measuring and interpreting interdomain routing dynamics. Most of them, however, are based on the approach of off-line and passive post-processing BGP routing updates. We propose a new methodology that uses real-time and active monitoring to troubleshoot various BGP routing anomalies. This paper focuses on a specific BGP routing problem -missing routes that occur when some ASes can reach a prefix while others can't. The idea is to periodically monitor the BGP routing status at multiple vantage points, like Route Views, and when a possible missing route event is detected issue traceroute queries from various looking glasses to learn of the packet-forwarding path status. By comparing previous and current packet-forwarding paths, we can have an idea of where the missing route event takes place. This paper examines the plausibility of this methodology and discusses preliminary experimental results.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years researchers have observed and examined various problems in the inter-domain routing system. The causes of these routing problems can be understood through analytic modeling, e.g., E-BGP and I-BGP route oscillation problems [6, 1, 7] and missing routes [11] . The dynamics of how these problems occur in Internet, however, are not well understood. For example, an ISP announces a prefix to the inter-domain routing system, but some ASes can observe the prefix while others can't. How does Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. this missing route problem happen? And where does it take place? Currently, there is no automated mechanism for resolving missing routes. Nevertheless, such mechanisms are important for the originating ISP to maintain reliable global reachability to its address space.
The two questions in understanding and troubleshooting such an inter-domain routing problem are how it happens (assigning root cause) and where it happens (determining location). These questions are made challenging by the lack of information about the routing problem. This insufficiency of information results in a diversity of possible routing events that can cause the same routing problem. In general, finding the root cause is more difficult than locating the place it happens [5] . Previous research on correlating multiple BGP update streams suggests that, in today's BGP paths with average length of 4.7 peerings, only about 2 peerings can be ruled out as a suspect that causes a path change while others are undecidable [3, 4] . Fundamentally, this arises because BGP is designed to abstract routing information in order to achieve scalability, hence the path information in BGP routing updates is too coarse to reasonably infer on where BGP path changes happen. Even if it were possible to locate the origin of a problem, routers support diverse mechanisms on routing configuration and different configurations may result in the same routing status, hence it is not possible to infer causality based on the change of routing status [3, 2, 4] . This paper proposes a methodology to estimate the location of a routing event in AS peering topology. Our methodology mirrors the manual techniques that ISP operators use to diagnose their routing problems. First, we periodically monitor the BGP routing status of multiple vantage points, e.g., Route Views, to detect possible missing route events by using a simple detection heuristic. The heuristic is not designed to identify every missing route event precisely, but to pick the prefixes (ranges of IP addresses) that may suffer a missing route problem for a significant period so that we can have enough time to diagnose the problem. Then we issue traceroute queries to various looking glasses to obtain current packet-forwarding paths to those suffering prefixes. By comparing the previous and current packet-forwarding paths, we can estimate the location of the problem.
MISSING ROUTE EVENTS
This section answers the following questions: How can missing route events happen? How can we detect the missing route events? How frequently do the missing route events happen (if problems are rare, then operators can just ignore them)?
How missing route events happen
Previous research has shown that prefixes originated from one ISP may not be seen by all ASes in the Internet [8, 11] . It was sug- gested that sometimes this is due to commercial strategies which are intentionally configured into routing policies and not a routing problem that we are interested in. What we are concerned is the "unintentional" missing route problem -for a period of time (minutes, hours, or days) an announced prefix cannot be reached by some ASes. The problem may take place in the origin AS (IBGP problems), AS peerings (EBGP problems), or the transit ASes (IBGP problems). We briefly describe the causes discovered by researchers and operators. Table 1 lists the possible causes of missing-route events. We roughly divide the "unintentional" causes into two categories: misconfiguration and network instability. The causes of misconfiguration are the direct results of human errors, while network instability includes hardware and software problems. This classification is not mutually exclusive since some network instability may result from combination of misconfiguration and network failures. We first describe the types of misconfiguration which may happen in various places [11] . plementation, or confusion about complex policy rules set by operators themselves.
Conflicting
In addition to the above misconfiguration errors, there can be some network instability that causes some routes not propagated temporarily. Here are two examples.
BGP Session Resets:
During a session reset, all the routes going through that peering are withdrawn and re-announced. There are many events that can cause BGP session resets or peering flaps. For example, KEEPALIVE messages are lost due to some layer 2 problems or heavy traffic, router reboots continually, rate limiting parameters are wrong, MTU is incorrectly set on links, PMTU discovery is disabled on routers, faulty MUXes, bad connectors, interoperability problems, PPP problems, satellite or radio problems, weather, etc.
Flap Damping: Route flap damping mechanism can result in convergence problem that suppresses the propagation of valid routes [9] .
The duration of missing routes varies for different causes and different network configurations. We are more interested in the events that last for a significant period (at least tens of minutes) than those transient events (a few minutes). We next consider the detection mechanisms by passively monitoring BGP routing status.
How can we detect the missing route events
ISP operators usually make use of various BGP vantage points like Route Views and RIPE RIS to check whether their prefixes appear in global BGP tables. Thus, a simple heuristic to detect missing routes is that as long as there is at least one vantage point unable to reach a prefix while others can, then a missing route event is said to happen. This heuristic, however, will sensitively detect those reachability problems that are caused by transient session failures, which is not what we want. We want to restrict the detection criteria to pick the missing route events that last for a significant period, e.g., 30 minutes.
From the BGP updates collected by Route Views from Jan. 1 to 31, 2004, we calculate the duration of each possible missing route event. Since it is impossible to know how many missing route events occurred within that period of time, we assume that each missing route affects only one prefix and we count the number of prefixes that experience the missing route problem. Figure 1 shows the average number of prefixes withdrawn at most t seconds per hour, that is, those prefixes are withdrawn from the BGP tables of some vantage points for at most t seconds. To understand whether the number of vantage points that observe the missing route events is correlated with the event duration, we classify the missing route events into three groups. In the figure, the solid line shows the number of prefixes (representing missing route events) withdrawn by all vantage points that ever observe them. The dashed line is for prefixes withdrawn by one vantage point while at least one other vantage point has routes to them. And the dotted line is for prefixes withdrawn by more than one vantage points when at least one other vantage point has routes to them. For the dashed line, there are two spikes: one in 50-60 seconds and another in 78-90 seconds, which are roughly two and three times of the default MinRouteAdver timer, respectively. We find that the many single-vantage-point withdrawals occur simultaneously for prefixes from various origin ASes. This observation indicates that single-vantage-point withdrawals (dashed line) are likely caused by transient events on the peering sessions near to vantage points. Also, since all-vantage-point withdrawals (solid line) are not missing route events according to the definition, it is only the some-vantage-point withdrawals (dotted line) that we are interested in.
Accordingly, our detection heuristic is to select the prefixes such that the routes to them are withdrawn by at least two vantage points. Intuitively these events likely take place in some transit peerings instead of the peerings adjacent to vantage points. Also, this event likely lasts long enough for us to localize it.
How frequently do the missing route events happen
Past research showed that up to 5% of Internet routing table was unreachable by some providers and 2,000 origin ASes not globally visible [8] . Figure 1 shows that there are, on the average, 3.5 prefixes per hour suffering the missing route problem according to our detection criteria, namely, at least two vantage points lose the routes to them for more than 30 minutes while other vantage points still have routes to them during that period of time. Our analysis also indicates that missing route problems happen daily and can last one to two days.
LOCALIZATION OF MISSING ROUTE EVENTS
This section is to answer these questions: How can we localize the missing route events? What are the costs of these localization methods?
The localization algorithm is to locate the suspect peerings that stop the route propagation. We first describe an ideal algorithm for this localization problem and why we can't use this algorithm in current stage. Then we propose other algorithms that we used in our experiments.
Prefix-Level Localization
The basic element for BGP policy configuration is prefix which is a range of IP addresses. Different prefixes originated from the same AS may have different routes and suffer from different routing events. The ideal localization algorithm can point out the suspect peerings that cause missing route problems to a specific prefix. x, a, b, c, d ). Ideally, if we know that looking glasses l and m previously reached the prefix p1 via the routes (l, ra, r b , rc, r d ) and (m, r b , rc, r d ), respectively (where ra is a router in AS-a), then we can use the following algorithm to locate the suspect peerings. We ask looking glasses l and m to traceroute to prefix p1. If m can reach p1 but l only traceroutes to ra and stops, then the peering (a, b) is a suspect peering.
In order to use this algorithm, we need to know the route from any looking glass to any prefix. Assuming there are 140,000 prefixes in default-free BGP tables and we query a looking glass for the route to a prefix every 60 seconds (this rate-limiting mechanism is to prevent our queries from overloading the looking glasses), then it takes 97.22 days to obtain the routing snapshot from each looking glass to all prefixes. If we increase the query rate to one prefix per one second, we can obtain the routing snapshot within two days, but it will impose a huge computational burden on the looking glass. So, this algorithm is not a practical solution for its high cost of routing status acquisition. Thus, we propose other algorithms that require less information and provide less accurate localization results. Figure 3 shows the same example of missing route events. But here we only know that looking glass l could reach prefix p2 via the route (l, ra, r b , re) and m could reach p3 via (m, r b , rc, r f ). Suppose the error that takes place in peering (a, b) is a peering failure (e.g., BGP session reset) that causes withdrawal of the paths (a, b, c, d ) for prefix p1 and (a, b, e) for prefix p2. Now, if we ask looking glass l to traceroute to p2, l will answer that it stops at ASa. Based on this answer, we can only say the peering (a, b) is a suspect peering if the cause of this missing route event is a peering failure. Consider otherwise: if the cause is a filter misconfiguration and affects only prefix p1, then no matter whether looking glass l can reach p2 we can not say anything about which peering is a suspect peering for this missing route event of p1. The cost of initial routing status acquisition for this algorithm is relatively small since we only need to know whether a looking glass can reach a specific peering. One way of obtaining that information is to ask each looking glass for its route to every AS. Assuming there are 14,000 ASes in the Internet, and we query a looking glass for the route to an AS every 60 seconds, then it takes 9.7 days to obtain the routing snapshot for each looking glass, which is acceptable.
Peering-level Localization

Approximate Prefix-level Localization
The peering-level localization algorithm is not suitable for localizing missing routes caused by problems other than peering failures, so we suggest using prefix-level localization with less knowledge of initial routing status. The idea is to let each looking glass be in charge of a subset of all prefixes, hence the overhead of initial probing can be reduced. For example, if there are 140,000 prefixes and 100 looking glasses, then each looking glass traceroutes to 5,000 prefixes one by one which takes 3.5 days. For each prefix, we have the initial routing status from 3-4 looking glasses. Based on this routing status, we can apply the prefix-level localization algorithm.
LOOKING GLASSES COVERAGE
This section describes the experimental results of probing initial routing status. We are interested in knowing how much of the topology is covered by a single looking glass since this extent of coverage affects what area of Internet our localization algorithms can work. Table 2 lists the looking glasses we used to estimate the coverage. The experiment is to make each looking glass issue traceroute probes to 16,575 ASes. The table shows that each looking glass discovers 31-42 thousand links (in router level) and 4-7 thousand AS peerings. The coverage is quite small -about 12% of AS peerings are covered by each looking glass.
The last column in the table shows the marginal information provided by the i-th looking glass when the first i looking glasses are used. That is, when we include one more looking glass into our monitor infrastructure, we obtain less than 1% more coverage of the entire peering topology. This observation suggests that it is more feasible to localize routing problems occurred in Internet core than in the edge which consists of large portion of peering topology that are not tracerouted from looking glasses.
The localization algorithms require diverse routing knowledge from multiple looking glasses. That is, the more looking glasses can reach a peering, the more likely we can detect the routing problems occurred in that peering. Figure 4 shows the number of visible peerings that are visible to exactly L looking glasses. Only 17,303 (30.01%) of total 57,672 peerings are visible to our looking glasses. 
Mapping Routers to ASes
The traceroutes return the IP addresses of the routers in the packet forwarding paths to the specified destination. To know what AS peerings included in the packet forwarding path, we need to map the router addresses to AS numbers. Previous research proposed a computationally intensive algorithm for IP-to-AS mappings based on dynamic programming [10] . Since our tool is designed to work in real time, we'd like to use simpler and faster approaches. There are two such methods. One is based on operational BGP tables, the other is based on IRR registry.
In the first method, we obtain the BGP tables from Route Views vantage points. Given a router address, we find the longest matched prefix. If the path to this prefix ends with AS-o, then we say the router is located in AS-o. As of Mar. 27, 2004, there are 198,238 prefixes in these BGP tables.
In the second method, we obtain the IRR databases from 59 IRRs (e.g., RIPE, RADB, ARIN, APNIC). The databases record that which prefix is allocated to which AS. Among the 198,238 prefixes in operational BGP tables, this method is able to decide the origin ASes of 171,013 (86%) prefixes.
We first use BGP tables to do the mappings, then if there is some router addresses not mapped, we make use of the IRR data. According to [10] , this mapping has 73% accuracy.
What Routers Block Traceroutes
As described previously, our experimental result shows that each looking glass has a small traceroute coverage of peering topology. There are two possible explanations for it. One is that many routers block the traceroute probes and render downstream routers untraceable. Another is that the peerings which are not "seen" are on the edge of Internet.
This section discusses the first explanation. We want to know whether the routers in some transit-ASes tend to block traceroutes. Our method is to compute for each transit AS-T the number of prefixes (or origin ASes) that can't be tracerouted because the traceroutes stopped at some router r in T . That is, router r is the last identified router for the traceroute to some origin AS. The actual blocking router is the next router to r, which cannot be identified (i.e., traceroute shows '*' for this router), hence we do not know which AS it belongs to. Currently, we assume this blocking router resides in the same AS (i.e., AS-T ) as the router r. Figure 5 shows an example. The result shows that there are 2,039 transit ASes where traceroutes from some looking glasses terminated. Most of these ASes are in the Internet core, so it is possible that some routers in these ASes are configured to block traceroute probes. However, we are unable to determine where these routers reside.
What Peerings Are Not Tracerouted
To examine the second explanation, we show the relation between the visibility of the peerings and the AS degree (we assume the ASes of low degree are on the edge of Internet). Specifically, the degree of peering (X, Y ) is min{degree(X), degree(Y )}. Figure 6 shows the CDF of the peerings that are not tracerouted. Figure 7 shows the CDF's of the peerings that are tracerouted by L looking glasses, where L is labeled in the end of the CDF curve. It appears that there is no significant correlation between the degree of peering and its visibility. Accordingly, we prefer the first explanation that some routers in Internet core ASes tend to block traceroutes.
LOCALIZATION EXPERIMENTS
Based on the initial routing status obtained in Section 4 we conduct experiments of localizing missing route events using two algorithms. The preliminary results are described below.
Peering-level Localization
This experiment uses the algorithm described in Section 3.2 to determine how many missing route events are caused by peering failures. First, we detect the possible missing-route events by monitoring vantage points' BGP tables. Specifically, we examine the BGP updates from Route Views vantage points every 15 minutes and choose one prefix p that matches the following conditions. 1. The routes to this prefix are withdrawn by at least two vantage points. So this event likely takes place in some transit peerings instead of the peerings adjacent to vantage points. Also, this event likely lasts long enough for us to localize it.
2. The AS peerings along those routes were all reachable by some looking glasses according to the initial routing status obtained in Section 4.
3. If multiple prefixes meet the above two conditions during past 15 minutes, select the prefix whose event occurrence time is latest. So this event likely lasts long enough for us to localize it.
Then, we determine whether this event is caused by peering failure by checking the reachability of the common peerings along the withdrawn routes. Specifically, supposed there are n common peerings {peeringi} in the withdrawn routes, we check the peering reachability by the following procedure:
1. For peeringi, we find the looking glasses {li,j} that tracerouted through peeringi to reach some IP address {ai,j}. 2. Send traceroute queries {ai,j} to looking glasses {li,j}. If at least one looking glass returns that it can reach peeringi, then peeringi is reachable, i.e., it doesn't suffer peering failure.
3. If there is one peering unreachable, then we say this missing route event is caused by peering failure occurred in that peering.
We ran the experiment for 4 days from Feb. 10 to 13, 2004. During the experiment, our monitor examines the vantage points' BGP tables 381 times (once per 15 minutes). The result shows that we detect 378 possible missing-route events, of which 11 events (2.91%) have some peerings unreachable.
Approximate Prefix-level Localization
This experiment tests the algorithm of Section 3.3. Similarly, we examine the BGP updates from Route Views vantage points every 15 minutes and choose one prefix p that matches the following conditions.
1. The routes to this prefix are withdrawn by at least two vantage points.
2. The initial routing status shows that we have more than three looking glasses (denoted by {li}) that had routes {r1,i} to this prefix.
3. If multiple prefixes meet the above two conditions during past 15 minutes, select the prefix whose event occurrence time is latest.
When such a prefix is found, we ask looking glasses {li} to traceroute to it and obtain the new routes {r2,i}. Then we compare the two set of routes {r1,i} and {r2,i} to infer the suspect peerings using the heuristics described in Section 3.1. We ran the experiment for a week from Mar. 21 to 27, 2004. During the experiment, our monitor examines the vantage points' BGP tables 669 times. The result shows that 534 possible missing-route events are detected, of which 54 events (10.11%) can be localized based on our heuristics.
FUTURE WORK
We have shown that missing routes are a problem in the Internet (about 3.5 occur every hour) and that existing monitoring infrastructure of looking glasses can provide us a rough location of the problem ASes (about 10% of the time using our prototype monitor). There is still much work to be done. First, we need to build query interface to more looking glasses so that we can reduce the query load for each looking glass and have more diverse initial routing status. Second, we'd like to know if there is a pattern of what routers are more likely to block traceroute queries. Finally, there is a problem of validation, i.e., how can we know our localization algorithms really catch the suspect peerings. We are cooperating with our ISP to setup a controlled experiment to validate these results.
